

Message Text

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SUBJECT: INTSUM 231 - JANUARY 12, 1977

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

1. PALESTINIANS. FATAH TERRORIST ABU DAOUD LEFT FRANCE YESTERDAY FOR ALGERIA AFTER A FRENCH COURT, CITING LEGAL TECHNICALITIES, REJECTED ISRAELI AND WEST GERMAN REQUESTS THAT HE BE HELD UNTIL EACH COUNTRY COULD MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST FOR EXTRADITION. THE RELEASE OF DAOUD, WHO WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE MASTERMINDED THE MASSACRE OF ISRAELI ATHLETES AT THE 1972 MUNICH OLYMPIC GAMES, BROUGHT STRONG PROTESTS FROM ISRAEL AND WEST GERMANY.

2. THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT ISSUED A STATEMENT CRITICIZING THE RELEASE ON THE GROUNDS THE COURT'S ACTION WOULD UNDERMINE RECENT EFFORTS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND AT THE UN TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION, SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 007144

TIONS, HOWEVER, SOME OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED RELIEF THAT DAOUD WAS FREED. THEY FEARED A DECISION TO TRY HIM IN GERMANY WOULD HAVE TRIGGERED NEW TERRORIST ACTIONS AND UNDERCUT GERMAN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES.

3. FRENCH OFFICIALS REPORTEDLY ARE IRRITATED BY WEST GERMANY'S RELUCTANCE TO DEMAND DAOUD'S EXTRADITION FOLLOWING HIS ARREST ON FRIDAY. ACCORDING TO A FRENCH OFFICIAL, INTERIOR MINISTER PONIATOWSKI AGREED--FOLLOWING TALKS

WITH HIS GERMAN COUNTERPARTS ON FRIDAY AND SATURDAY--
TO HOLD DAOUD UNTIL A FORMAL EXTRADITION REQUEST WAS
RECEIVED. WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT OVER THE WEEKEND THAT
SENIOR OFFICIALS IN BONN HAD SECOND THOUGHTS REGARDING
EXTRADITION, THE FRENCH DECIDED TO RELEASE DAOUD IF
A REQUEST WAS NOT RECEIVED BY MONDAY.

4. THE ISRAELI REACTION WILL PROBABLY BE LIMITED TO
STRONG DIPLOMATIC PROTESTS AND THE TEMPORARY RECALL OF
THEIR AMBASSADOR FROM PARIS. ISRAELI OFFICIALS PROBABLY
RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE THAT DAOUD WOULD
BE EXTRADITED TO ISRAEL BUT PROBABLY HOPED THAT HE WOULD
BE HELD AND POSSIBLY EVEN TURNED OVER TO THE WEST GERMANS.
HIS RELEASE BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, FORCED
THE RABIN GOVERNMENT TO UNDERLINE STRONGLY ITS UNHAPPINESS
WITH PARIS' ACTION.

5. FRANCE IS ONE OF ISRAEL'S IMPORTANT TRADING PARTNERS,
AND ISRAEL IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE ANY STEP THAT WOULD
JEOPARDIZE THIS RELATIONSHIP. THE FRENCH HAVE SUPPLIED
THE ISRAELIS WITH IMPORTANT COMPONENTS OF THE "KFIR"
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AS WELL AS SEARCH RADAR FOR THE GABRIEL
MISSILE. MOREOVER, THE ISRAELIS ARE UNLIKELY TO TAKE
ANY ACTION THAT MIGHT DELAY THE SIGNING OF THE EC-
ISRAEL FINANCIAL AGREEMENT WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR LATER
THIS MONTH. (SECRET/NOFORN)

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 007144

6. THE 40-MAN PALESTINE CENTRAL COUNCIL (PCC) CONVENED
YESTERDAY EVENING IN DAMASCUS FOR FURTHER DELIBERATIONS
ON SEVERAL KEY PALESTINIAN ISSUES. THE PRINCIPAL TOPIC
WAS EXPECTED TO BE THE EXPANSION OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL
COUNCIL (PNC). THIS MOVE HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE
MODERATE ARAB STATES IN AN EFFORT TO INCLUDE MORE MODERATES
AND INDEPENDENTS. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE SYRIAN
NEWSPAPER AL-BAATH, PNC CHAIRMAN KHALID AL-FAHUM ASSERTED
THAT THE PLO PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (THE PLO EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE PLUS A FEW OTHERS), WHICH MET DECEMBER 30, HAD
DECIDED TO ADD 120 MEMBERS TO THE PNC. THIS WOULD IN-
CREASE THE TOTAL FROM THE PRESENT 180 HEAVILY DOMINATED
BY COMMANDO REPRESENTATIVES--AND INCREASE THE REPRESENTA-
TION FROM THE GULF STATES AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
IT IS HOPED BY THE MODERATE ARABS THAT AN EXPANDED PNC
WOULD BE WILLING TO FOLLOW THE OTHER ARABS INTO NEGOTIA-
TIONS.

7. A PROMINENT EAST BANK PALESTINIAN INFORMED EMBASSY
AMMAN THAT HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY A PLO REPRESENTATIVE
SEEKING HIS CONCURRENCE TO ATTEND THE PNC MEETING IN CAIRO
AS A NEW MEMBER OF AN EXPANDED PNC; HE WAS TOLD THAT THE
SYRIANS HAD PROPOSED HIS NAME. THE SOURCE COMMENTED
THAT HE BELIEVED A TOTAL OF 80-120 NEW MEMBERS WOULD

BE ADDED TO THE PNC, AND SAID HE HAD SEEN A LIST OF THOSE BEING CONSIDERED. EACH WAS A MODERATE WITH A GOOD REPUTATION AMONG PALESTINIANS IN GENERAL, AND THE SOURCE FELT THIS NEW GROUP WOULD HOLD THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE PNC. HE ADDED THAT THE ENLARGED PNC WOULD SELECT A NEW PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. LEBANON. PHALANGE RADIO ANNOUNCED THAT CHRISTIAN FORCES--INCLUDING THE PHALANGE, SHAMOUNISTS, THE TANZIM, AND THE GUARDIANS OF THE CEDAR--HAD BEGUN SURRENDERING THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS TO ASF TROOPS EARLY YESTERDAY
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 007144

MORNING, IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE QUADRIPARTITE SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE'S ORDER TO DO SO BY MIDNIGHT TODAY. WITH THE DEADLINE APPROACHING, HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION AS YET THAT THE PALESTINIANS AND LEFTISTS HAVE BEGUN TO TURN THEIR ARMS OVER TO THE ASF. THE PROSPECT OF A SYRIAN CRACKDOWN AND POSSIBLE ARMS SWEEP, AS OUTLINED TO AMBASSADOR MURPHY BY SYRIAN CHIEF OF STAFF SHIHABI, THUS BECOMES MORE LIKELY.

9. IN A CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR MURPHY, SHIHABI REPEATED HIS EARLIER ASSESSMENT THAT SYRIAN ELEMENTS OF THE ASF WOULD BE NEEDED IN SOUTH LEBANON SINCE THE NON-SYRIAN ASF TROOPS WOULD BE INCAPABLE OF IMPOSING ORDER THERE. REGARDING PALESTINIAN INTENTIONS IN THE SOUTH, SHIHABI SAID PLO MORALE WAS CURRENTLY LOW, AND THUS THEY WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO INITIATE CROSS BORDER RAIDS INTO ISRAEL.

10. PLA TROOPS BEGAN PREPARATIONS YESTERDAY TO PULL OUT OF THE COUNTRY. THE MOVE WAS REPORTEDLY IN KEEPING WITH THE SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE'S ORDER THAT THEY DO SO BY MIDNIGHT TODAY. THE KUWAITI PRESS REPORTED THAT KUWAIT'S REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COMMITTEE HAD ASSERTED THAT ARAFAT GAVE A WRITTEN PROMISE TO WITHDRAW PLA ELEMENTS FROM LEBANON TO THE RECENT FOREIGN MINISTER'S MEETING IN RIYADH. (CONFIDENTIAL)

11. EGYPT. EMBASSY CAIRO REPORTED THAT, IN AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT, FAHMI MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS, INTER ALIA, ON EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY:

--THERE ARE "POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT" BETWEEN THE US AND EGYPT, ESPECIALLY THE VOLUME OF US AID TO ISRAEL;

AND STEPS MAY TAKE PLACE ON THIS (EMBASSY CAIRO INTER-
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 007144

PRETED THIS TO MEAN A SADAT/BREZHNEV MEETING IS POSSIBLE,
OR AT LEAST THE EGYPTIANS WISH FOR ONE);

--THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IS THE MOST SUITABLE FORUM
TO PURSUE A MIDEAST PEACE AGREEMENT, BUT IF EFFORTS ON
THIS FAIL, EGYPT WILL ASK THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO
DISCUSS A FINAL SETTLEMENT;

--THE PLO "CAN DEPEND ON EGYPT," AND THE PLO SHOULD HAVE
AN INDEPENDENT DELEGATION AT GENEVA. (UNCLASSIFIED)

12. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO WAS QUOTED BY
THE EGYPTIAN DAILY AL-AKHBAR AS SAYING THAT SADAT AND
HUSSEIN, DURING THEIR FORTHCOMING MEETINGS WOULD ADDRESS
THE QUESTIONS OF JORDANIAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE SYRIAN-
EGYPTIAN "UNIFIED POLITICAL COMMAND, AND OF COORDINATION
OF THEIR POLICIES REGARDING THE ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE.
REUTER NOTED THAT JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER BADRAN HAD
STATED ON JANUARY 10 THAT JOINT COMMITTEES HAD BEEN FORMED
TO WORK ON THE POSSIBILITY OF JORDAN JOINING THE POLITICAL
COMMAND. MOREOVER, EMBASSY AMMAN OBSERVED THAT THE
JORDANIAN PRESS HAD EDITORIALIZED FAVORABLY ON "THE EMERGING
CAIRO-DAMASCUS-AMMAN AXIS" AND HAS SAID THAT THE "FULL
DIMENSIONS WILL BECOME KNOWN FOLLOWING HUSSEIN'S TRIP."

13. NEVERTHELESS, GIVEN SADAT'S APPARENT LACK OF CON-
CRETE QUESTIONS TO TALK ABOUT WITH THE KING AND THE
IMPROMPTU NATURE OF THE MEETING, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT
HUSSEIN'S VISIT WILL PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.
RATHER, IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE TWO LEADERS WILL LIMIT
THEIR EFFORTS TO INFORMAL COOPERATION VIS-A-VIS THE
PEACE PROCESS.

14. EMBASSY CAIRO ALSO REPORTED THAT, DESPITE EGYPTIAN
FOREIGN MINISTRY ASSERTIONS TO THE CONTRARY, A KNOWLEDGEABE
ARAB JOURNALIST STATED THAT HE HAD LEARNED KING KHALID
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 007144

HAS NO INTENTION OF VISITING EGYPT, SINCE HE HAS NO URGENT
MATTERS TO DISCUSS WITH SADAT. (CONFIDENTIAL)

15. AHAM NOTES THAT SADAT WILL DEPART JANUARY 13 FOR
ASWAN, WHERE HE WILL REMAIN AT LEAST THROUGH UPCOMING
TALKS WITH HUSSEIN (JANUARY 13-16) AND PRESIDENT TITO
(TENTATIVELY JANUARY 20-27). THE EMBASSY COMMENTED THAT
SADAT'S ESCAPE FROM THE MIASMA OF CAIRO WINTER WEATHER
IS A YEARLY OCCURANCE, AND HE HAS ALREADY HAD ONE BOUT

WITH INFLUENZA THIS YEAR. AHAM DOES NOT SPECUALTE ON
HOW LONG HE WILL STAY IN UPPER EGYPT, BUT HE IS EXPECTED
ALSO TO RECEIVE UN SYG WALDHEIM THERE IN EARLY FEBRUARY.
(LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

16. ISRAEL. ALLON REPORTEDLY TOLD THE WEEKLY CABINET SESSION THAT THE FACT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS A CARE-TAKER WOULD NOT PREVENT IT FROM MAKING ITS VIEW KNOWN TO THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION. ALLON ADDED THAT "WE HAVE SEEN TO IT" THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT ADOPT A NEW POSITION OR TAKE AN INITIATIVE REGARDING THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION WITHOUT CONSULTING THE ISRAELIS. ALLON STRESSED THAT THE CARETAKER ROLE WOULD NOT AFFECT THE COMPETENCE OF THE RABIN CABINET TO UNDERTAKE DISCUSSIONS ON MIDEAST MATTERS, BUT A GOVERNMENT SOURCE TOLD THE POST THAT US-ISRAELI CONSULTATIONS WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE APRIL, AND WOULD LIKELY BE POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

17. EMBASSY TEL AVIV COMMENTED THAT CONVERSATIONS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT THEY ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE PROPOSED WALDHEIM VISIT TO ISRAEL. THE OPTIMUM DESIRE OF THE ISRAELIS IS TO LIMIT HIS ROLE IN MIDEAST NEGOTIATIONS TO A CEREMONIAL ONE; THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT HE IS BECOMING TOO ACTIVE. WHEN WALDHEIM ARRIVES, THE ISRAELIS HAVE SAID HIS RECEPTION WILL BE FROSTY IF
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 007144

HE EMPHASIZES THE EGYPTIAN UNGA RESOLUTION AS THE REASON FOR HIS VISIT. MOREOVER, WALDHEIM WILL PROBABLY COME WHEN THE LABOR PARTY'S LEADERSHIP QUESTION (RABIN VS. PERES) HAS NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED, ADDING TO THE PROBLEMS WITH HIS VISIT. (CONFIDENTIAL)

18. MOROCCO. SOVIET-MOROCCAN RELATIONS ARE IMPROVING AFTER REACHING A LOW POINT LAST YEAR BECAUSE OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN MOROCCO AND ALGERIA OVER WESTERN SAHARA. IN THE PAST FIVE WEEKS, SEVERAL DEVELOPMENTS HAVE REFLECTED THE RENEWED INTEREST IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. THESE INCLUDED DISCUSSIONS ON THE SALE OF T-62 TANKS, ON CONTINUATION OF SOVIET PROSPECTING FOR COPPER AND OIL, AND MOROCCAN APPROVAL FOR AN AEROFLOT STOP IN CASABLANCA FOR FLIGHTS BOUND ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA.

19. KING HASSAN'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ADDITIONAL SOVIET MILITARY TECHNICIANS MAY COMPLICATE THE SIGNING OF A NEW ARMS AGREEMENT. THE SOVIETS DID, HOWEVER, DELIVER MUNITIONS FOR USE IN SOVIET ARMS THAT HAD BEEN DELIVERED

EARLIER UNDER A 1974 AGREEMENT. THE USSR HAD HELD BACK ON MUNITIONS DELIVERIES DURING THE SAHARA CONFLICT.

20. MOROCCO'S WILLINGNESS TO GO AHEAD WITH THE TALKS ON GEOLOGICAL COOPERATION IS A REVERSAL. MOROCCO HAD CANCELLED PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET INCLINATION TO SIDE WITH ALGERIA IN THE DISPUTE OVER

WESTERN SAHARA.

21. THE SOVIETS NONETHELESS HAVE HAD PROBLEMS WITH ALGERIA'S ESPOUSAL OF RADICAL THIRD WORLD CAUSES, AND THEY ARE INTERESTED IN MOROCCAN PHOSPHATES AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE USSR'S DOMESTIC PRODUCTION. HASSAN, HOWEVER, MAY NOT BE WILLING TO ALLOW SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE EXPLOITATION OF MOROCCAN PHOSPHATE RESERVES.

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 007144

22. THE KING, WHILE WARY OF SOVIET INTENTIONS, MAY THINK HE CAN USE HIS INCREASING CONTACTS WITH THE USSR AS A LEVER IN EXTRACTING MORE FROM THE US. BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE USSR WOULD ALSO DEFLATE ARAB CHARGES THAT MOROCCO IS TOO CLOSELY LINKED WITH THE US AND COULD ENCOURAGE A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE FROM ALGERIA.
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